The puppet show began with a familiarization phase, whose purpose was to show that each puppet had the goal of crossing the stage. In this phase, one puppet crossed the stage alone from right to left and then the other puppet crossed alone from left to right. Next came the action phase, in which the two puppets tried to cross the stage in opposite directions at the same time. The puppets met in the middle and bumped into each other repeatedly. Finally, one puppet yielded to the other by making a “bowing” motion (rotating to face downward) and moving upstage, out of the other puppet’s way. The other puppet then continued past the bowing puppet and across the stage (see
for details). After the puppet show ended, an experimenter who did not know which puppet had yielded held out both puppets toward the infant; the dependent measure was which puppet the infant reached for (see
). This is a common way of measuring preferences in human infants and non-human primates [
].
Discussion
To recap, in this series of experiments, 10- to 16-month-old infants chose (i.e., reached for) the puppet who yielded, rather than the puppet who prevailed, in two types of zero-sum conflict (Experiment 1 and replication, Experiment 5). This was true even when neither puppet went on to reach its goal (
Exp. 2). However, when one puppet yielded to the other and then both puppets went on to achieve their goals (in other words, when the situation was a win/win rather than a zero-sum) infants showed no preference for either puppet (Experiment 3). Likewise, when there was no conflict between the puppets, infants no longer chose the bowing puppet or the puppet who ended without the rattle (Experiments 4 and 6). These results stand in contrast to recent reports that children just a few months older (ages 21–31 months) choose the other puppet (the winner) in the same right-of-way conflict used here [
]. This raises not only the question of why infants choose the loser (yielder) in these conflicts but also why their choices appear to change between infancy and toddlerhood.
We considered the possibility that infants may prefer a puppet who yields because they see yielding as helping the other puppet reach its goal [
]. However, infants also chose the yielder in Experiment 2, where the other puppet did not reach its goal. Another form of the “helper” explanation might be that infants prefer those who
intend to help someone achieve a goal [
]. But the results of Experiment 3 did not support this version: when one puppet yielded the way (thus helping the other puppet reach its goal) and then went on to reach its
own goal, infants no longer chose the helper. Moreover in Experiment 4, where the puppets were moving in the same direction and one puppet stopped and moved aside, effectively clearing a path for the other puppet, infants showed no preference for the puppet who cleared the path. In other words, we found no evidence that the results of Experiments 1 and
2 can be explained by an overall preference for helpers.
We also considered the possibility that infants may choose the yielder because they feel sympathy for a puppet who loses a conflict and/or fails to reach its goal. This explanation would be consistent with studies showing that, when 10-month-olds see one shape squishing another one, they reach for the squished shape over a neutral shape. In other words, infants seem to prefer a victim over a neutral character [
]. However, in the case of the present experiments, we are skeptical for two reasons. First, in our puppet shows, the aggression was mutual and symmetrical—the puppets bumped into one another. Second, the yielding puppet in our experiments appears to move out of the way voluntarily (i.e., its motion is self-generated), so it is not squished or pushed by the other puppet. Thus, it makes the puppet in our studies seem like less of a victim than those in the shape-squishing studies.
A variation of the “pity for the victim” explanation is that infants might choose any puppet who failed to reach its goal. But if that were true, then they should not choose either puppet more than the other in Experiment 2 (where neither puppet reaches its goal), when in fact they chose the yielding puppet. Similarly, if infants prefer an individual that fails to reach its goal, then they should choose the puppet who stops halfway across the stage in Experiment 4. Again, that is not what we found: when there was no conflict between the puppets, infants showed no preference for the one that stopped and bowed.
In our view, the most plausible interpretation of the present results is that the infants saw these conflicts in terms of social status and avoided the higher status puppet. This interpretation is consistent with previous research showing that infants recognize social status cues in zero-sum conflicts like the ones used here [
,
,
,
,
]. It also makes sense given that how individuals behave in conflicts is a stable indicator of their social status [
,
,
,
,
,
]. Infants’ avoidance of high-status individuals echoes behavior seen in several non-human species where individuals avoid or withdraw from high-status others. This avoidance may be adaptive in situations where high-status individuals commit random acts of aggression [
] or infanticide [
,
,
].
The present results stand in contrast to those from recent studies that used the same experimental setup with toddlers 21–31 months old. In those studies, toddlers chose the winner of the conflict, implying that there is a shift such that infants prefer low-status individuals and toddlers prefer high-status ones. These are the first studies to show such a shift, and we can only speculate about its nature. It seems to echo a pattern seen in the development of other social cognitive abilities, such as those measuring joint attention and over-imitation [
,
]. In these areas, among others, we see infant cognition showing similarities with non-human species and uniquely human social behaviors emerging in toddlerhood.
In the present case, infants’ avoidance of high-status others echoes similar behaviors in many non-human species, where high-status individuals present a threat. Among humans, however, high-status individuals are not necessarily aggressive or physically threatening. They are often responsible for protecting and guiding subordinates, and they typically control resources like information, wealth, and social connections [
].Thus, in human societies, forming relationships with high-status people is often beneficial [
,
].
In sum, we think a possible explanation of our findings is that infants view high-status and/or dominant individuals with wariness or fear, consistent with the dynamics of dominance hierarchies in many non-human species. This speculation is supported by the previous research finding that, when infants see interactions like the present ones, they recognize status differences among the characters [
,
]. In contrast to infants, toddlers appear to view high-status others the way older children and adults do: as potentially valuable allies. This interpretation of our data is consistent with other research showing that toddlers at 21 months distinguish between “bullies” and “leaders” [
,
] and that older children look to high-status individuals for information [
,
,
].
Further studies could test this account. For example, it would be useful to do a version of these experiments where infants decide between a puppet who was involved in the zero-sum conflict and a puppet who was not. This would show us whether infants actively prefer the low-status individual or wish to avoid the high-status one. For now, we present evidence of a previously undiscovered developmental shift: given a choice between the winner and yielder in a right-of-way conflict, toddlers choose those who win and infants choose those who yield.